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The theory's distress prediction (Proposition 3 above) is based upon the assumption that individuals are equally sensitive to equity; that is, the general preference is that outcome/input ratios be equal to that of the comparison other. This premise has been termed the "norm of equity" (Carrell & Dittrich, 1978 Yet, research into reward allocations (i.e., how individuals distribute outcomes among receivers) has identified other norms that appear to contradict the norm of equity. Leventhal (1976) , for example, suggested three distribution rules that an individual might employ when allocating outcomes to others: (a) the contribution (equity) rule, where others are rewarded outcomes in proportion to their inputs; (b) the needs rule, where others are rewarded based upon their legitimate needs, and (c) the equality rule, where others receive equal outcomes irrespective of their individual inputs. These distribution rules, as Mowday (1983) indicated, suggest that different norms govern the allocation of rewards. Also, a number of studies (e.g., Shapiro, 1975; Reis & Gruzen, 1976; Greenberg, 1978) have shown that allocators do not universally adhere to the equity norm when distributing outcomes to others. Thus, evidence suggests that the norm of equity has important exceptions, at least in terms of how one allocates to others.
Despite the absence of research into norms that receivers employ when evaluating their own outcomes, research on individual differences also suggests exceptions to the norm of equity. These exceptions include both demographic variables such as sex (Austin & McGinn, 1977 (Swap & Rubin, 1983) . Plus, as Major and Deaux (1982) indicated in their review of individual differences in justice behavior (i.e., reward distributions and reactions to injustice), the effects of individual differences also vary according to whether experimental subjects are allocating outcomes to themselves and/or others, or whether they are simply reacting to inequitable treatment from others.
The notion of individual differences in regard to equity has received little systematic attention in the organizational behavior literature. In fact, two reviews of equity theory (Miner, 1980; Mowday, 1983 ) have underscored the value of examining individual differences in equity research. Yet Major and Deaux (1982) concluded that much of this research is "scattershot" and "opportunistic" (p. 44), relying heavily on easily identifiable demographic variables and involving ex post facto reasoning from results. Of special significance is the absence of any theoretical framework or paradigm for conceptualizing and understanding individual differences in reactions to inequity. This paper sets forth a new construct, equity sensitivity, that, as a personality variable, potentially can explain individual differences in reactions to inequity. Relationships between equity sensitivity and individual reactions to inequity in organizations are proposed, and suggestions about how this construct can potentially improve the utility of equity theory are offered.
The Equity Sensitivity Construct
As indicated, research on individual differences suggests that a number of demographic and psychological variables affect how individuals allocate to themselves and/or others, as well as how they react to inequitable treatment. With few exceptions (e.g., The Protestant Work Ethic), these variables are conceptually independent of equity itself. The equity sensitivity construct proposed here relates directly to equity theory and suggests that individuals react in consistent but individually different ways to both perceived equity and inequity because they have different preferences for (i.e., are differentially sensitive to) equity. Figure 1 presents a continuum of these preferences with three classes of individuals represented along the continuum: (a) Benevolents, those who prefer their outcome/input ratios to be less than the outcome/input ratios of the comparison other; (b) Equity Sensitives, those who, conforming to the traditional norm of equity, prefer their outcome/input ratios to equal those of comparison others; and (c) Entitleds, those who prefer their outcome/input ratios to exceed the comparison other's.
Benevolents
The conceptual roots of benevolence can be traced to the psychology of individuals by Alfred Adler (Adler, 1935; Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956; Rychlak, 1973) , who typed individuals by their reactions to others in interpersonal relationships. Salient among Adler's types is the "socially useful," the individual who "thinks more of giving than receiving" (Rychlak, 1973, p. 116) 'prepared for cooperation and contribution" (Mosak, 1959, p. 194 Generally, then, Benevolents are givers. Their contentment derives from perceptions that their outcome/input ratios are less than the comparison other's. Distress occurs for Benevolents either when the two ratios (P and 0) are equal or when the Benevolent's ratio is greater.
Equity Sensitives
Equity Sensitive individuals represent the traditional equity theory model, and thus, require little description. Briefly, they subscribe to the norm of equity and feel distress when either overrewarded or underrewarded. Equity Sensitives are most content when their outcome/input ratios equal those of the comparison other.
Equity Sensitives feel "distress" when underrewarded and guilt when overrewarded. This is the only group that experiences both of these feelings. Benevolents are satisfied when underrewarded and experience guilt when either equitably-or overrewarded. Entitleds are satisfied when overrewarded and feel "distress" when under-or equitably-rewarded.
Equity Sensitives may score higher than Benevolents or Entitleds on Swap and Rubin's (1983) Interpersonal Orientation scale. If a person is oriented toward a focus on the other party in a relationship, then he/she should be more concerned with an equitable relationship than a person who scores low on interpersonal orientation.
Entitleds
The label "Entitled" is taken from Coles' description (1977a, 1977b), which used the term to describe the affluent child who "has much, but wants and expects more, all assumed to be his or hers by right-at once a psychological and material inheritance the world will provide" (Coles, 1977a, p. 85). Greenberg and Westcott (1983) extended Coles' concept of entitlement to the general population; they described Entitleds as having high thresholds for feeling indebted: "Whatever aid [outcomes] they receive is their due, and therefore they feel little or no obligation to reciprocate. They exist in a world where all but one are debtors" (p. 105).
Adlerian psychology also provides the conceptual basis for entitlement. In sharp contrast to Adler's socially useful (Benevolent) individual, the "getting type": Exploits and manipulates life and others by actively or passively putting others into his service. He tends to view life as unfair for denying him that to which he is entitled. He may employ charm, shyness, temper, or intimidation as methods of operation. He is insatiable in his getting (Mosak, 1971 , p. 78).
Mosak (1959) identified several factors that appear to promote development of an Entitled orientation: (a) post-World War II cultural values that have changed from getting ahead by doing to getting ahead without doing; (b) overly permissive childrearing practices which encourage children, especially the youngest, the ill, the handicapped, or the only child to get; and (c) our "age of anxiety" (which has not changed dramatically since the late 1950s) where, given uncertainties in the future, we are encouraged to "get as much as we can before the hydrogen bomb falls" (p. 194).
Therefore, Entitleds are getters: They subscribe to the exploitative equity relationship described by Hatfield and Sprecher (1983) , where their own outcome/input ratios exceed those of comparison others. Distress would occur if they were not "getting a better deal" than their comparison other.
Sources of General Equity Preferences
The different general preferences for equity among Benevolents, Equity Sensitives, and Entitleds can be traced to more specific preferences that are delineated through three sets of propositions; each set of propositions builds upon its predecessor. Second, American students, in ten situations where choices between high and low outcomes for self were required, opted for high outcomes in eight of those ten situations. These preferences are consistent with the Entitled's orientation toward "getting" and may at least partially reflect cultural values that, according to Mosak (1959) Generally, it is proposed that not all individuals adhere to the norm of equity. As shown in the research on individual differences, reactions to inequity appear to vary along with certain demographic and personality variables. The equity sensitivity construct is a parsimonious explanation for consistent reactions to equity/inequity because it identifies the individual preferences for equity according to Benevolent, Entitled, or Equity Sensitive orientations.
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Further, it is proposed that Benevolents, Entitleds, and Equity Sensitives first look for situations that match their own internal standards of equity (Pritchard, 1969) . If these situations also are congruent with their preferences vis d vis the comparison other, then equity exists, as does contentment. Some degree of distress occurs when outcome/input ratios for self are not consistent with internal standards, but this distress is at least partially ameliorated if outcome/input ratios for self and other are congruent with general equity preferences. The highest degree of distress occurs when neither outcome/input ratios for self nor assessment of these ratios against the comparison other's is consistent with the individual's preferences.
Equity Sensitivity in Organizations
The equity sensitivity construct poses a number of implications for equity research in organizations. Three general propositions describing posited relationships between perceptions of equity and an important organizational outcome job satisfaction-for Benevolents, Equity Sensitives, and Entitleds are presented. Then the relationship between equity sensitivity and an individual's perceptions of ambiguous job inputs and outcomes is discussed. Equity theory proposes that, as a result of the distress of either overreward or underreward, inequitably rewarded individuals should experience lower levels of job satisfaction than equitably rewarded individuals (Adams, 1965; Locke, 1976; Pritchard et al., 1972) . Adams (1965) also argued that the threshold for inequity presumably would be higher for overrewarded individuals, who might rationalize their overreward as "good fortune" without the attendant distress. Thus, following general equity theory predictions, it is expected that the relationship between perceptions of equity and job satisfaction will be inverted and u-shaped, similar to that shown for Equity Sensitives in individuals should report low satisfaction levels; equitably rewarded individuals, high satisfaction; and overrewarded individuals, low to moderate satisfaction. Figure 3 incorporates the equity sensitivity construct into the standard equity theory prediction, with the following proposed:
Equity Sensitivity and
A negative, linear relationship should exist between Benevolents' perceptions of equity and job satisfaction.
As the solid line in Figure 3 shows, it is expected that Benevolents would report higher levels of job satisfaction when they are underrewarded than when they are either equitably rewarded or overrewarded.
Proposition 5:
An inverted u-shaped relationship should exist between Equity Sensitives' perceptions of equity and job satisfaction.
As indicated earlier, Equity Sensitives are predicted to follow the traditional equity model. Thus, as in Figure 3 , they should experience the highest levels of satisfaction when equitably rewarded.
Proposition 6 1. On a piece-rate system, Entitleds consistently will produce at a high level, but the quality of their work will be consistently low. 2. Under the equitably-rewarded condition on a piece-rate system, Benevolents will produce the highest quality work. 3. On a salary or wage, Benevolents will produce consistent quality and quantity under all three reward conditions. 4. For Benevolents, absenteeism and turnover will be consistent regardless of reward level; Entitleds will have the highest absenteeism and turnover in the equitably-rewarded condition. Thus, it is proposed that equity sensitivity will moderate relationships between perceptions of equity and organizational outcomes. However, demonstrating the validity of a variable as a moderator variable is a difficult process. Large sample sizes are necessary (Schmidt & Hunter, 1982; Zedeck, 1971) . Also, the strict definition that a moderator variable is "found to be linearly uncorrelated with both the predictor variable and the criterion variable. . ." (Ghiselli, Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981 , p. 478) makes the prediction that equity sensitivity is a moderator variable a rather tenuous prediction. However, if its validity as a moderator variable is demonstrated, this would have significant potential for reducing unexplained variance in equity research in organizations.
Equity Sensitivity and Ambiguous Job Elements
The equity sensitivity construct also appears relevant to how individuals actually perceive inputs and outcomes. As Pritchard (1969), Campbell and Pritchard (1976), and others noted, one problem in equity research is the extent to which individuals view specific job elements as inputs or outcomes: One individual might perceive "doing challenging work" as an outcome, while another might view this job element as an input. Tornow (1970 Tornow ( , 1971 
Conclusion
The equity sensitivity construct suggests that individuals do not conform consistently to the norm of equity. Instead, individuals react consistently to specific, but different, preferences they have for the balance between their outcome/input ratios and that of a comparison other. Benevolents prefer that their outcome/input ratios be less than the comparison other's; Equity Sensitives, who adhere to the norm of equity, prefer balanced outcome/input ratios; and Entitleds prefer that their outcome/input ratios exceed the comparison other's. Furthermore, these general preferences for equity can be traced to internal standards that characterize the Benevolent as emphasizing own inputs exceeding own outcomes; the Entitled, own outcomes exceeding own inputs; and the Equity Sensitive, own outcomes equaling own inputs.
As an individual difference variable, equity sensitivity is proposed to moderate relationships between an individual's perceptions of equity and organizational outcomes such as job satisfaction, quantity and quality of work, absenteeism, and turnover. The construct also provides a framework to explain how individuals perceive ambiguous job elements, a problem that has received far too little attention in research on organizational behavior. Given the psychologically based conceptual basis that has been used to develop the notion of equity sensitivity, the construct should be related to other personality variables, such as need for approval.
One final but important issue is the extent to which equity sensitivity is a state or a trait. If it is a state, then an individual's propensity toward Benevolence, for example, would vary with changes in the situation (e.g., a Benevolent in one job might show Entitled preferences in a later job). If it is a stable trait, then Benevolence would persist from one job to the next. Obviously, this is an empirical question; yet, it is the suspicion of the present authors that it is a trait. As the previous discussion of the sources of Benevolent, Equity Sensitive, and Entitled preferences suggests, these preferences represent values emanating from both cultural (e.g., the Calvinistic heritage) and individual psychological (e.g., altruism) areas. Thus, changes in these prefer-ences presumably would occur rarely and only as the consequences of grossly significant changes in the situation.
This suspicion that equity sensitivity is a trait also is tempered by the possibility that individuals may show different preferences during different life contexts. For example, individuals might exhibit Entitled preferences at work, but consistently Benevolent preferences in their relationship with their spouse. This implies that either different distinct traits exist or that researchers may simply be identifying different alternative states of the same trait. The initial prediction of the present authors is the latter. But in either case, the construct has important implications for how individuals react to the perceptions of equity in the workplace. Investigation of equity sensitivity should increase the accuracy of prediction of behavioral and attitudinal outcomes. This increased accuracy should enhance the utility of equity theory as a framework for understanding and predicting organizational behavior.
